A note on “Quality investment and inspection policy in a supplier-manufacturer supply chain”

Gerhard Aust, Ina Bräuer and Udo Buscher

European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, vol. 234, issue 3, 910-915

Abstract: In a recent paper, Hsieh and Liu (2010) consider quality investment and inspection strategies of one supplier and one manufacturer. They propose solutions of four non-cooperative game models with different degrees of information available about the players’ inspection sampling rates and quality investments. For the two most comprehensive scenarios, we show that these (interior) solutions do not always represent the optimal solutions, as the boundary solutions lead to considerably higher profits. Furthermore, we propose modified algorithms providing the optimal solutions by including the boundary solutions into the consideration.

Keywords: Quality investment; Quality inspection; Supplier–manufacturer supply chain; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:234:y:2014:i:3:p:910-915

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.11.004

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