 Supply chain structure in a market with deceptive counterfeitsJie Zhang and Rachel Q. Zhang European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, vol. 240, issue 1, 84-97 Abstract: Deceptive counterfeits differ from non-deceptive ones in that they are packaged and sold as authentic brand name products so that consumers may buy counterfeits unknowingly. When a distribution channel, referred to as the general channel, has been penetrated with deceptive counterfeits, a brand name company may need to restructure the way its products are distributed and rely on reliable channels such as certified stores or manufacturer-owned stores to guarantee 100% authenticity. In this paper, we first identify the conditions under which the general channel will carry deceptive counterfeits, and then analyze the optimal supply chain structure in the presence of counterfeits as well as by incorporating the wholesale price decisions, consumers’ risk attitude towards counterfeits and consumer loyalty towards the reliable stores. Our main finding is that the brand name company should continue to sell, sometimes exclusively, through the general channel despite deceptive counterfeiting under various conditions. Keywords: Supply chain management; Deceptive counterfeit; Channel structure (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:240:y:2015:i:1:p:84-97 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.06.041 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier |
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