Values of games with weighted graphs

González–Arangüena, Enrique, Conrado Miguel Manuel and Mónica del Pozo

European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, vol. 243, issue 1, 248-257

Abstract: In this paper we deal with TU games in which cooperation is restricted by means of a weighted network. We admit several interpretations for the weight of a link: capacity of the communication channel, flow across it, intimacy or intensity in the relation, distance between both incident nodes/players, cost of building or maintaining the communication link or even probability of the relation (as in Calvo, Lasaga, and van den Noweland, 1999). Then, according to the different interpretations, we introduce several point solutions for these restricted games in a way parallel to the familiar environment of Myerson. Finally, we characterize these values in terms of the (adapted) component efficiency, fairness and balanced contributions properties and we analyze the extent to which they satisfy a link/weight monotonicity property.

Keywords: TU-game; Weighted graph; Myerson value; Fairness; Balanced contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:243:y:2015:i:1:p:248-257

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.11.033

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