On solving matrix games with pay-offs of triangular fuzzy numbers: Certain observations and generalizations

S. Chandra and A. Aggarwal

European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, vol. 246, issue 2, 575-581

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to highlight a serious omission in the recent work of Li (2012) for solving the two person zero-sum matrix games with pay-offs of triangular fuzzy numbers (TFNs) and propose a new methodology for solving such games. Li (2012) proposed a method which always assures that the max player gain-floor and min player loss-ceiling have a common TFN value. The present paper exhibits a flaw in this claim of Li (2012). The flaw arises on account of Li (2012) not explaining the meaning of solution of game under consideration. The present paper attempts to provide certain appropriate modifications in Li’s model to take care of this serious omission. These modifications in conjunction with the results of Clemente, Fernandez, and Puerto (2011) lead to an algorithm to solve matrix games with pay-offs of general piecewise linear fuzzy numbers.

Keywords: Game theory; Fuzzy pay-offs; Fuzzy numbers; Multiobjective optimization; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:246:y:2015:i:2:p:575-581

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.05.011

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