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Coordinating decentralized linear programs by exchange of primal information

Martin Albrecht and Hartmut Stadtler

European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, vol. 247, issue 3, 788-796

Abstract: We present a scheme for coordinating decentralized parties that share central resources but hold private information about their decision problems modeled as linear programs. This setting is of particular importance for supply chains, in which the plans of independent, often legally separated, parties have to be synchronized. The scheme is based on an iterative generation and exchange of proposals regarding the parties’ input to or withdrawal from the central resources (i.e. primal information). We prove that the system-wide optimum can be identified in a finite number of steps. A simple numerical example illustrates the information exchange and the models involved when coordinating a two-stage supply chain.

Keywords: Coordination; Collaborative planning; Linear programming; Supply chain management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:247:y:2015:i:3:p:788-796

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.045

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European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

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