Customers’ strategic behavior in batch arrivals M2/M/1 queue

Sofiane Ziani, Fazia Rahmoune and Mohammed Said Radjef

European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, vol. 247, issue 3, 895-903

Abstract: The investigated problem is the analysis of customers’ strategic behavior in a single server Markovian M2/M/1 queue with batch arrivals of two customers with a reward-cost structure. At their arrival time, customers can decide to join the queue or to balk. The utility of each one depends on his decision, on his partner’s decision and on the system state. Two cases are considered: when the system provides the information about its state (observable case), and when this information is not provided (unobservable case). Both problems are modeled as games in extensive form with complete and imperfect information. We give the Nash equilibria for each corresponding game and we compare between both cases in order to determine the policy which arranges the system’s manager.

Keywords: Queueing; Batch arrivals; Extensive form game; Nash equilibrium; Behavioral strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:247:y:2015:i:3:p:895-903

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.040

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