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The effects of an undisclosed regular price and a positive leadtime in a presale mechanism

Wanxia Mei, Li Du, Baozhuang Niu, Jincheng Wang and Jiejian Feng

European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, vol. 250, issue 3, 1013-1025

Abstract: A presale program is popular with manufacturers who wish to reduce the risk posed by uncertain demands. We introduce a new price mechanism in which the manufacturer during the presale period does not disclose the exact regular price in the sale period although it is guaranteed to customers to be higher than the presale price. As positive leadtime is much overlooked in presale models, we analyze the rationality of including one. The numerical results in this paper show that both the specific price mechanism and the positive leadtime have significant effects on the manufacturer’s policy (production quantity, presale price, regular price), the expected profit, and customer behaviors. The optimal discount rate should be greater than 50 percent. This conclusion is consistent with existing results of surveys on saturation points. The manufacturer can take advantage of the latest information on demand gathered in the presale period to update their policy and increase their expected profit.

Keywords: Risk managment; Leadtime; Presale; Price; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:250:y:2016:i:3:p:1013-1025

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.033

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European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

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