Optimal search and ambush for a hider who can escape the search region

Steve Alpern, Robbert Fokkink and Martin Simanjuntak

European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, vol. 251, issue 3, 707-714

Abstract: Search games for a mobile or immobile hider traditionally have the hider permanently confined to a compact ‘search region’ making eventual capture inevitable. Hence the payoff can be taken as time until capture. However in many real life search problems it is possible for the hider to escape an area in which he was known to be located (e.g. Bin Laden from Tora Bora) or for a prey animal to escape a predator’s hunting territory. We model and solve such continuous time problems with escape where we take the probability of capture to be the searcher’s payoff.

Keywords: Game theory; Two-person games; Search games; Search problems; Predator–prey interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:251:y:2016:i:3:p:707-714

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.12.017

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