Sustaining cooperation in a differential game of advertising goodwill accumulation

Steffen Jørgensen and Ekaterina Gromova

European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, vol. 254, issue 1, 294-303

Abstract: The paper suggests a differential game of advertising competition among three symmetric firms, played over an infinite horizon. The objective of the research is to see if a cooperative agreement among the firms can be sustained over time. For this purpose the paper determines the characteristic functions (value functions) of individual players and all possible coalitions. We identify an imputation that belongs to the core. Using this imputation guarantees that, in any subgame starting out on the cooperative state trajectory, no coalition has an incentive to deviate from what was prescribed by the solution of the grand coalition’s optimization problem.

Keywords: Differential games; Advertising competition; Core imputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221716301576
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:254:y:2016:i:1:p:294-303

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.03.029

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().