Price of anarchy in a linear-state stochastic dynamic game

Elena Parilina (), Artem Sedakov and Georges Zaccour

European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, vol. 258, issue 2, 790-800

Abstract: We consider a linear-state dynamic game played over an event tree and determine analytically the price of anarchy (PoA), which is given by the ratio of player’s outcome in the cooperative game to her outcome in the noncooperative game. Next, we illustrate our findings in the context of a pollution control problem. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to assess the impact on PoA, and its lower and upper bounds, of varying the different parameter values.

Keywords: Price of anarchy; Dynamic games; Event tree; Cooperation; Linear-state games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:258:y:2017:i:2:p:790-800

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.09.025

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