An option contract for vaccine procurement using the SIR epidemic model

N. Shamsi G., S. Ali Torabi and H. Shakouri G.

European Journal of Operational Research, 2018, vol. 267, issue 3, 1122-1140

Abstract: Timely and adequate supply of vaccines in disastrous situations has a key role in controlling communicable diseases. This paper develops a specific option contract for proactively provisioning required vaccine doses from two suppliers (a main and a backup). The model aims to minimize the procurement and social costs using the SIR epidemic model. A novel hybrid solution procedure is developed using the optimal control theory, Stackelberg game model and nonlinear programming approaches. To evaluate the performance of the developed solution method, a number of numerical examples are presented and their results are discussed.

Keywords: OR in disaster relief; Vaccination; Option contract; Optimal control; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:267:y:2018:i:3:p:1122-1140

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.013

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