Games in sequencing situations with externalities

Guangjing Yang, Hao Sun, Dongshuang Hou and Genjiu Xu

European Journal of Operational Research, 2019, vol. 278, issue 2, 699-708

Abstract: In this paper, we consider cooperative games in sequencing situations with externalities, called partition sequencing games, in which the worth of a coalition can be influenced by external players in the queue. We first show that partition sequencing games satisfy cohesiveness and have non-positive externalities. Then by proposing partition rules, which are specifications on how external players should partition themselves, we study the relationships between the allocation given by the Equal Gain Splitting rule (EGS rule) and the cores based on different partition rules. It is shown that the EGS rule always yields a core element no matter which partition rule is applied to the game. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the EGS rule for partition sequencing games.

Keywords: Game theory; Sequencing games; Partition function form games; Core; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:278:y:2019:i:2:p:699-708

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.046

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