Pricing decision of a manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric information
Jianheng Zhou,
Ruijuan Zhao and
Weishen Wang
European Journal of Operational Research, 2019, vol. 278, issue 3, 809-820
Abstract:
We construct and examine a screening model of a supply chain where a dominant manufacturer and a retailer operate under asymmetric information. In this model, the retailer adds an online channel to her offline store and can offer imperfect substitute products through these dual channels. We show that when the manufacturer can specify the retailer's resale prices for both offline and online channels, and when the retailer's reservation utility is market-type dependent, if the uncertainty in demand is high enough, the manufacturer pays zero information rent and extracts greater revenue. We find that the manufacturer should set the channel price—online and offline—based on multiple factors for each channel, such as uncertainty in demand, market size, and demand sensitivity to price.
Keywords: Supply chain management; Pricing strategy; Screening model; Dual channels; Incentive mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037722171930390X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:278:y:2019:i:3:p:809-820
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.05.006
Access Statistics for this article
European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati
More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().