Competitive location and pricing on a line with metric transportation costs

Claudio Arbib, Mustafa Ç. Pınar and Matteo Tonelli

European Journal of Operational Research, 2020, vol. 282, issue 1, 188-200

Abstract: Consider a three-level non-capacitated location/pricing problem: a firm first decides which facilities to open, out of a finite set of candidate sites, and sets service prices with the aim of revenue maximization; then a second firm makes the same decisions after checking competing offers; finally, customers make individual decisions trying to minimize costs that include both purchase and transportation. A restricted two-level problem can be defined to model an optimal reaction of the second firm to known decision of the first.

Keywords: Pricing; Location; Sequential games; Multi-level programming; Computational complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:282:y:2020:i:1:p:188-200

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.08.042

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