Do charities spend more on their social programs when they cooperate than when they compete?

Bertrand Crettez, Naila Hayek and Georges Zaccour

European Journal of Operational Research, 2020, vol. 283, issue 3, 1055-1063

Abstract: We consider two charities whose revenues are used on advertising to attract market share, on administrative expenditures to manage the charity, and on program expenditures. Assuming a finite planning horizon, we seek to answer the following research question: are there any circumstances under which the charities devote less funds to their programs when they cooperate than when they compete? We obtain that this may well be the case for some parameter values. In particular, if the charities are myopic, that is, if they disregard the future benefits they can earn after the current planning cycle, then they will always spend less on their social programs when they cooperate than when they do not.

Keywords: Game theory; Charities; Dynamic games; Management style; Advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:283:y:2020:i:3:p:1055-1063

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.044

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