 Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurementHong Wang European Journal of Operational Research, 2020, vol. 283, issue 3, 1124-1135 Abstract: We study competitive procurement administered by an agent who is supposed to evaluate bids on both price and quality by a scoring rule designed by the principal. Since the agent is in charge of verifying delivered quality, he has an opportunity to manipulate his evaluation of quality proposals in exchange for a bribe. In the presence of corruption, the optimal mechanism can be implemented by both first-score and second-score auctions in such a way that the scoring rule should deemphasize quality relative to price. We further identify factors that influence equilibrium corruption: (1) more efficient suppliers are willing to pay higher bribe; (2) the probability of corruption is decreasing in competition and increasing in the agent’s manipulation power; (3) compared to the first-score auction, the second-score auction leads to higher equilibrium bribe and thus is more vulnerable to corruption. Keywords: Project management; Multidimensional procurement; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:283:y:2020:i:3:p:1124-1135 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.053 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier |
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