An evolutionary approach to fraud management
Giovanni Rabitti and
European Journal of Operational Research, 2020, vol. 284, issue 3, 1167-1177
Building on several contributions to the analysis of insurance fraud, we propose a dynamical model of the fraudulence game, where three typologies of players interact: the insurance company, the fraudsters and the honest insured (who may be tempted to become dishonest), each one taking decisions on the basis of an adaptive strategy.
Keywords: Risk management; Fraudulence; Evolutionary model; Decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:284:y:2020:i:3:p:1167-1177
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