Job Allocation and Profits in Service Production

Günter Fandel and Jan Trockel

European Journal of Operational Research, 2020, vol. 287, issue 3, 1052-1061

Abstract: We consider a decision situation in which a buyer's non-recurring allocation of two heterogeneous and independent service jobs to three different types of suppliers – two specialists and one generalist – depends on different profits (payments) of the parties (players) involved. The decision situation is modelled as a non-cooperative game with simultaneous one-shot moves. The optimal decisions assigning and accepting the jobs are derived by determining Nash-equilibria in pure and mixed strategies.

Keywords: OR in service production; Decision making; Supplier-buyer-relationships; Non-cooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:287:y:2020:i:3:p:1052-1061

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.055

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