Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers

Souvik Ghosh and Refael Hassin

European Journal of Operational Research, 2021, vol. 295, issue 1, 1-11

Abstract: This paper summarizes the literature on efficiency loss when agents selfishly optimize their utility in stochastic queueing systems. The price of anarchy is the most popular measure for quantifying this loss, but we also discuss other measures. The queueing models are introduced briefly and results on the loss of efficiency are discussed.

Keywords: Queueing; Non-cooperative games; Measure of efficiency; Price of anarchy; Braess paradox, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:295:y:2021:i:1:p:1-11

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.03.065

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