Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties

Tzvi Alon and Moshe Haviv

European Journal of Operational Research, 2022, vol. 303, issue 1, 480-486

Abstract: A single machine processes a random number of identical jobs on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis. Processing times are independent and identically distributed with a general integral distribution. Each job is held by a strategic player who needs to choose a time slot to arrive at. The individual objective is to reduce the sum of two types of linear in time costs: lateness and waiting. The resulting decision making model is, then, a symmetric non-cooperative game. We derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium for this game, and discuss its structural properties.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:303:y:2022:i:1:p:480-486

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.02.032

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