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Managing the tragedy of commons and polluting emissions: A unified view

Gustav Feichtinger, Luca Lambertini (), George Leitmann and Stefan Wrzaczek

European Journal of Operational Research, 2022, vol. 303, issue 1, 487-499

Abstract: We address the issue of regulating both polluting emissions through a generic tax and access to a common resource pool in a dynamic oligopoly game. Our analysis shows that once industry structure is regulated so as to induce the industry to harvest the resource in correspondence of the maximum sustainable yield, social welfare is either independent or decreasing in the tax if firms do not invest in abatement technologies, while, if they do, the policy maker may increase the tax to foster both individual and aggregate green research and development to attain abatement technologies, ideally up to the level at which emissions and the associated environmental damage are nil. This also allows us to detect the arising of the win-win solution associated to the strong form of the Porter hypothesis. We extend the analysis to encompass product differentiation and monopolistic competition, to show that qualitatively analogous conclusions obtain.

Keywords: OR in environment and climate change; Sustainability; Differential games; Green research and development; Porter hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:303:y:2022:i:1:p:487-499

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.02.034

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European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

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