 Strategic manipulation in group decisions with pairwise comparisons: A game theoretical perspectiveYasuo Sasaki European Journal of Operational Research, 2023, vol. 304, issue 3, 1133-1139 Abstract: We discuss the issue of strategic manipulation in group decision-making via pairwise comparisons. Pairwise comparisons play a pivotal role in the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Although there is a large amount of literature on its application to group decisions, very little attention has been paid to the strategic issue: a group decision can be biased by strategically dishonest individuals. We aim to draw attention to the problem and provide a formal perspective to deal with it. We consider a scenario of group decision-making where the inputs are the individuals’ pairwise preferences and the outcome is in their interest. We formulate this situation as a strategic game where the individuals decide how to submit their pairwise preferences. Theoretical results show that truthful reporting can be a dominant strategy only in very limited situations, and moreover it is often weakly dominated. Keywords: Group decisions and negotiations; Pairwise comparisons; The analytic hierarchy process; Game theory; Manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:304:y:2023:i:3:p:1133-1139 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.015 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier |
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