EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How to charge in servicizing: Per period or per use?

Hamed Vafa Arani, Morteza Pourakbar, Erwin van der Laan and René de Koster

European Journal of Operational Research, 2023, vol. 304, issue 3, 981-996

Abstract: In a servicizing business model, the service provider sells a product’s functionality, not the product per se. This study aims to find the best profit-maximizing pricing strategies for this business model that can also yield the highest consumer welfare with minimal environmental impact. This approach identifies win-win-win strategies satisfying profit, planet, and people objectives. As providers charge consumers based on usage (pay-per-use) versus a regular flat fee (pay-per-period), the economic, environmental, and welfare implications of such strategies remain unclear. We tackle this problem using a stylized game-theoretic model where the service provider first designs the pricing schemes, and consumers react by adjusting use. When offering a single product, we observe that pay-per-use policies outperform pay-per-period when the service provider is cost-inefficient or small-scale. Also, where per-use consumers are not very sensitive to payment frequency, service providers tend to exclude low usage-valuation users. Outperformance also prevails when the proportion of low-use consumers is sufficiently low. Our results show that a win-win strategy can be achieved by offering a pay-per-use policy to high usage-valuation consumers, however, a win-win-win strategy is never possible. We also analyze the problem for a situation where the service provider offers a product line including green and regular products. Then, we characterize possible win-win-win strategies that hinge on environmental impact from different phases of a product’s lifecycle. We extend the models to allow SP i) influence the size of market segments and ii) decide on product greenness levels in different phases of its lifecycle.

Keywords: Servicizing; Product-Service systems; Pricing; Sustainable operations; Incentive design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221722003605
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:304:y:2023:i:3:p:981-996

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.002

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:304:y:2023:i:3:p:981-996