How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources

Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

European Journal of Operational Research, 2023, vol. 305, issue 1, 493-500

Abstract: We study equilibrium in a multi-battle attack-and-defense game in which victory in each single battle is deterministically awarded to the player who expends more conflict resources in the respective battle. One player has a pre-determined budget which can be allocated across two battlefields. The cost of the budget is sunk. The other player can mobilize an arbitrary amount of resources at given marginal costs. Our analysis reveals a strategic advantage of the player with the fixed and given budget: this player wins all battlefields with probability one if the budget is at least half the total value of winning.

Keywords: OR in defense; Attack and defense; Multi-battle conflict; Blotto budget; All-pay contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:305:y:2023:i:1:p:493-500

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.050

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