Fair division of goods in the shadow of market values

Dall’Aglio, Marco

European Journal of Operational Research, 2023, vol. 307, issue 2, 785-801

Abstract: Inheritances, divorces or liquidations of companies require common assets to be divided among the entitled parties. Legal methods usually consider the market value of goods, while fair division theory takes into account the parties’ preferences expressed as utilities. I combine the two practices to define a procedure that optimally allocates divisible goods with market values to people with easily elicited preferences. Imposing an exact equality onn the bundles’ monetary values may produce unacceptable solutions. I drop the tight requirement and suggest a procedure in which the differences in the monetary values are explained in terms of satisfaction per monetary share as perceived by the agents. A robustness study shows the consequences of misspecification in the model parameters.

Keywords: Group decision and negotiation; Fair division; Divisible goods; Private law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:307:y:2023:i:2:p:785-801

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.10.025

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