Evaluation of counterparty credit risk under netting agreements

Ahmadreza Tavasoli and Michèle Breton

European Journal of Operational Research, 2025, vol. 320, issue 2, 402-416

Abstract: We investigate counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustments in portfolios including derivatives with early-exercise opportunities, under a netting agreement. We show that credit risk and netting agreements have a significant impact on the way portfolios are managed (that is, on options’ exercise strategies) and, therefore, on the value of the portfolio and on the price of counterparty risk. We derive the value of a netted portfolio as the solution of a zero-sum, finite horizon, discrete-time stochastic game. We show that this dynamic-game interpretation can be used to determine the value of the reglementary capital charges required of financial institutions to cover for counterparty credit risk and we propose a numerical valuation method. Numerical investigations show that currently used numerical approaches can grossly misestimate the value of credit valuation adjustments.

Keywords: Game theory; Finance; CVA; Netting; Options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221724006428
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:320:y:2025:i:2:p:402-416

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2024.08.019

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().