Do stable outcomes survive in marriage problems with myopic and farsighted players?

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

European Journal of Operational Research, 2025, vol. 322, issue 2, 713-724

Abstract: We consider marriage problems where myopic and farsighted players interact and analyze these problems by means of the myopic-farsighted stable set. We require that coalition members are only willing to deviate if they all strictly benefit from doing so. Our first main result establishes the equivalence of myopic-farsighted stable sets based on arbitrary coalitional deviations and those based on pairwise deviations.

Keywords: Marriage problems; Core; Stable sets; Myopic and farsighted players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Related works:
Working Paper: Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players? (2020)
Working Paper: Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players? (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:322:y:2025:i:2:p:713-724

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2024.12.043

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