Revealing the political decision toward Chinese carbon abatement: Based on equity and efficiency criteria

Jinlan Ni (), Chu Wei and Limin Du

Energy Economics, 2015, vol. 51, issue C, 609-621

Abstract: China's economic reform over the past 30years has allowed the free market to drive economic development. However, government still plays a key role in the energy sector by allocating energy conservation and emissions abatement. How does the government make an equity decision as a tradeoff to market efficiency? This is an unanswered question. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the government's preference toward equity and efficiency. Using the provincial level CO2 intensity allocation data, we investigate the political decision that the government made based on the equity and efficiency criteria. We find that the equity index plays a more important role than the efficiency index in determining the CO2 intensity target. In addition, political factors such as social stability are found to be important factors.

Keywords: China; Equity; Efficiency; Preference; Policy-maker (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D72 Q52 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:51:y:2015:i:c:p:609-621

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.08.027

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