Fast charging stations: Simulating entry and location in a game of strategic interaction

Valeria Bernardo, Joan-Ramon Borrell and Jordi Perdiguero

Energy Economics, 2016, vol. 60, issue C, 293-305

Abstract: This paper uses a game of strategic interaction to simulate entry and location of fast charging stations for electric vehicles. It evaluates the equilibria obtained in terms of social welfare and firm spatial differentiation. Using Barcelona mobility survey, demographic data and the street graph we find that only at an electric vehicle penetration rate above 3% does a dense network of stations appear as the equilibrium outcome of a market with no fiscal transfers. We also find that price competition drives location differentiation measured not only in Euclidean distances but also in consumer travel distances.

Keywords: Electric vehicle; Fast charging; Games of strategic interaction; Entry models; Regional planning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L43 Q52 Q58 R53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Fast Charging Stations: Simulating Entry and Location in a Game of Strategic Interaction (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:60:y:2016:i:c:p:293-305

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2016.09.026

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