Fast Charging Stations: Simulating Entry and Location in a Game of Strategic Interaction
Valeria Bernardo (),
Joan-Ramon Borrell () and
Jordi Perdiguero ()
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Valeria Bernardo: Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona
No 201513, IREA Working Papers from University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics
This paper uses a game of strategic interaction to simulate entry and location of fast charging stations for electric vehicles. It evaluates the equilibria obtained in terms of social welfare and firm spatial differentiation. Using Barcelona mobility survey, demographic data and the street graph we find that only at an electric vehicle penetration rate above 3% does a dense network of stations appear as the equilibrium outcome of a market with no fiscal transfers. We also find that price competition drives location differentiation measured not only in Euclidean distances but also in consumer travel distances.
Keywords: Regional Planning; Electric Vehicle; Fast Charging; Games of Strategic Interaction; Entry Models JEL classification: Q48, Q58, L13, L43, R53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2015-05, Revised 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-gth, nep-tre and nep-ure
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Journal Article: Fast charging stations: Simulating entry and location in a game of strategic interaction (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ira:wpaper:201513
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