Evolutionary game analysis on the behavior strategies of power producers in renewable portfolio standard
Yu-zhuo, Zhang and
Energy, 2018, vol. 162, issue C, 505-516
Renewable portfolio standard (RPS) plays a significant role in developing renewable energy. This study developed an evolution game model of power producers to analyze the symbiotic evolution between RPS and the electric producers’ behavior strategies, and discuss the impacts of the key institutional parameters on the dynamic evolution process of electric producers. To verify the theoretical results, simulation experiments and sensitivity analysis were conducted with meaningful results: Trading Tradable Green certificates (TGC) could become the common belief of all power producers, with the scientific design of institutional parameters. An optimal quota, higher unit fine, lower transaction cost and marginal cost difference of green and thermal power contribute to improving the effectiveness of RPS. This study could provide some scientific recommendations for government to design and construct RPS.
Keywords: Renewable portfolio standard; Tradable green certificates; Behavior strategies; Evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:162:y:2018:i:c:p:505-516
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