Evolutionary game analysis of behavioral strategies between government agencies and coal companies -- air interval charge blasting technology promotion

Jiaming Gao and Li Zhang

Energy, 2025, vol. 314, issue C

Abstract: The research into the economic impacts of green mining technology lags significantly behind, posing a substantial obstacle to the future advancement and industrialization of green mining technology. Moreover, the advancement of green mining technology is heavily reliant on the strategies employed by stakeholders. Therefore, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model tailored to specific technology applications and further develops a reinforcement learning model using a payment matrix, aimed at study the behavioral strategies of government agencies and coal enterprises in promoting air interval charge blasting technology (AICBT). By identifying the economic indicators for calculating the energy savings and emission reductions of AICBT and the economic indicators resulting from the decisions of government organizations, considering the game's topic from the angles of strategy and reward, and assessing the influence of key variables. The findings indicate that: (1) The promotion impact is determined by the coal company's expertise in air spacer charging technology; (2) Research costs incurred by coal companies and government forfeiture earnings are essential to the spread of AICBT; (3) China's carbon emissions trading market rules are now unable to directly promote cleaner production choices by coal companies.

Keywords: Air interval charge blasting technology; Evolutionary game theory; Reinforcement learning; Government organization; coal company (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:314:y:2025:i:c:s0360544224040143

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2024.134236

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