Evolutionary game analysis of microgrids’ grid connection under government reward and punishment mechanism

Yanbin Li, Xinzhu Su, Yun Li and Feng Zhang

Energy, 2025, vol. 318, issue C

Abstract: The Chinese government has expressed interest in grid-connected microgrids as a means of moderating the impact of renewable energy on the power system. Nevertheless, the increased operational costs associated with grid-connected microgrids may act as a disincentive for grid enterprises to accept such microgrids on their grids. It is the responsibility of government regulators to ensure that grid enterprises act in a fair and open manner. As grid-connected microgrids assume a more prominent role in the power system, it is becoming increasingly crucial to examine more efficacious approaches to government regulation. This study establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model of government regulators, grid enterprises, and microgrids. It studies the evolutionary outcomes of the system under static reward and punishment mechanisms and dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms. Finally, it analyzes the impact of reward and punishment ceilings on the outcomes. The findings of the study indicate that an increase in rewards and punishments can facilitate the evolutionary trajectory of grid enterprises toward fairness and openness. Among the four reward and punishment mechanisms, the dynamic punishment mechanism is the most effective.

Keywords: Microgrids' grid connection; Evolutionary game; Reward and punishment mechanism; Evolutionary stable strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:318:y:2025:i:c:s0360544225003184

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2025.134676

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