Incentive mechanism design for mandatory green certificate trading in China: A collective action perspective

Zhou Ying, Jia Xuefeng, Wang Hui and Huang Junling

Energy, 2025, vol. 319, issue C

Abstract: Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) system is a mandatory institutional change for China to achieve low-carbon energy transition, its implementation will trigger collective action by market participants. At present, there are market anomalies in the voluntary green certificate trading market in China, such as having no market and low liquidity. Implementing mandatory green certificate trading and designing reasonable incentive mechanisms can effectively solve the collective action dilemma caused by free-riding behavior. Based on the system dynamics model of collective action evolutionary game of market participants, this paper analyzes the incentive effect of relevant institutional parameters of RPS on collective action. The results show that institutional parameters such as quota, penalty, issuance cost coefficient and benchmark price are the key incentive mechanisms affecting the evolutionary equilibrium results of collective action. Specifically, the higher penalty can increase the proportion of quota subjects participating in collective action and play a good incentive role. Lower issuance cost coefficient and benchmark price can encourage green power manufacturers to participate in collective action and improve TGC market liquidity. Quota has no significant incentive effect on the collective action of market participants. Therefore, the scientific design of incentive mechanisms for collective action will effectively promote China's RPS system.

Keywords: Renewable portfolio standards; Tradable green certificates; Incentive mechanism; Collective action; System dynamic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:319:y:2025:i:c:s0360544225006929

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2025.135050

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