Study on the diffusion of China Certified Emission Reduction scheme under carbon trading mechanism: Based on the tripartite evolutionary game model

Jiahao Wu, Yuhuan Zhao, Shunan Fan, Ziyi Zhao, Sumin Zuo and Jiayang Wang

Energy, 2025, vol. 322, issue C

Abstract: The China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme is of great significance for China to achieve its carbon neutrality goal. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among government, coal-fired power plants and renewable energy enterprises under the carbon trading mechanism, and employs a system dynamics (SD) model based on the tripartite evolutionary games to simulate the evolutionary paths of the game system and conducts the sensitivity analysis of important parameters. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) Currently, the diffusion of the CCER scheme in China is in the development stage. (2) The carbon trading market has guidance for the diffusion of CCER scheme. Appropriately increasing the offset rate, the unit price of CCER quotas, and reducing the initial carbon quotas, can stimulate the willingness of renewable energy enterprises to invest in CCER projects. (3) The equilibrium strategy of game system is influenced by key parameters and other stakeholders' initial strategies. Lower investment costs, higher power generation rate, appropriately increasing the penalties of over-emit CO2 and investment subsidies will increase the probability of renewable energy enterprises investing in CCER projects. This study can provide a reference for policy makers to develop CCER scheme in carbon trading mechanisms.

Keywords: China Certified Emission Reduction scheme; Carbon trading mechanism; Tripartite evolutionary game model; Sensitivity analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 O25 Q48 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:322:y:2025:i:c:s036054422501285x

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2025.135643

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