Dynamic interactions of carbon reduction strategies in the shipping industry considering market cyclicality: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Daozheng Huang, Xiaoyang Yang, Yongfeng Zhang and Jin Wang

Energy, 2025, vol. 335, issue C

Abstract: The carbon reduction requirement of the International Maritime Organization imposes huge compliance costs to the shipping community. This research explores the interactive mechanism of behavioral strategies among governments, carriers, and shippers based on a tripartite evolutionary game model. Different periods of shipping market fluctuations are discussed in the context of the carbon trading system. When the shipping market is prosperous, implementing low-carbon policies can more effectively enhance the enthusiasm of carriers for emission reduction. Additionally, this research conducts sensitivity analysis on carbon prices, subsidies and transportation costs, providing feasible suggestions for the green transformation of the shipping industry.

Keywords: Market cyclicality; Emission trading; Evolutionary game; Alternative fuels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:335:y:2025:i:c:s0360544225036059

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2025.137963

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