Game-theory-based generation maintenance scheduling in electricity markets

C.G. Min, M.K. Kim, J.K. Park and Y.T. Yoon

Energy, 2013, vol. 55, issue C, 310-318

Abstract: This paper presents a novel approach to the (generation maintenance scheduling) GMS problem in electricity markets. The main contribution of this study is the modeling of a coordination procedure for an (independent system operator) ISO, based on a game-theoretic framework for the GMS problem. The GMS process of generation companies (Gencos) is designed as a non-cooperative dynamic game, and the Gencos' optimal strategy profile is determined by the Nash equilibrium of the game. The coordination procedure performed by the ISO is characterized by the use of a reliability assessment and a so-called ‘rescheduling signal’. A numerical example for a three-Genco system is used to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed scheme to the GMS problem. The results obtained indicate that the GMS of a profit-oriented Genco can be modified to satisfy the reliability requirements of the ISO.

Keywords: Coordination; Electricity market; Generation maintenance scheduling; Nash equilibrium; Non-cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544213002569
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:55:y:2013:i:c:p:310-318

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2013.03.060

Access Statistics for this article

Energy is currently edited by Henrik Lund and Mark J. Kaiser

More articles in Energy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().