Corporate governance: Why agency theory is not enough

David Band

European Management Journal, 1992, vol. 10, issue 4, 453-459

Abstract: The author discusses agency theory, or the managerial theory of the firm, and finds it suffers from limitations. However, the theory does illuminate conflicts of self-interest, such as those between shareholders and top management. David Band concludes with a further reservation about agency theory -- its avoidance of ways in which exploitation can be structurally encouraged by the asymmetric distribution of power in bureaucracies.

Date: 1992
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