The poison warrant: A powerful poison pill

Cynthia Van Hulle and Koen Geens

European Management Journal, 1993, vol. 11, issue 2, 214-218

Abstract: Following the hostile bid for Société Générale in Belgium, companies have adopted 'poison' warrants as a means of deterring raiders. They appear to circumvent many important rules of Belgian takeover legislation. Cynthia Van Hulle and Koen Geens demonstrate that poison warrants would mainly benefit larger shareholders in companies subject to attack.

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/026323739390044I
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eurman:v:11:y:1993:i:2:p:214-218

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/115/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... me/115/bibliographic

Access Statistics for this article

European Management Journal is currently edited by Michael Haenlein

More articles in European Management Journal from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().