Implications for Including Shared Strategic Control in Multi-party Relationship Models

Richard Arend

European Management Journal, 2006, vol. 24, issue 1, 38-48

Abstract: Contextual uncertainty and firm heterogeneity produce the potential for benefits from multi-party relationships, as well as the potential for inefficiencies in such relationships. We introduce the issue of shared control as a factor in the proper modeling of many multi-party relationships, such as that between a venture capitalist and entrepreneur. We find that adding this degree of freedom to the standard multi-party models (such as the principal-agent model) generates direct and indirect effects on the results. Under the most common circumstances, we predict that more potential for inefficiencies (e.g., pooling) will occur when parties share strategic control.

Keywords: Shared; control; Multi-party; relationships; Information; asymmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0263237305001465
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eurman:v:24:y:2006:i:1:p:38-48

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/115/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... me/115/bibliographic

Access Statistics for this article

European Management Journal is currently edited by Michael Haenlein

More articles in European Management Journal from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().