Formal governance, interfirm coordination, and performance in partnerships: An empirical investigation of a mediation model
Young Rok Choi,
Phillip Phan and
Jaepil Choi
European Management Journal, 2020, vol. 38, issue 3, 413-424
Abstract:
This study investigates the extent to which formal governance mechanisms such as contracts and equity ownership affect interfirm coordination and partnership performance. We analysed data from a survey of 301 Korean firms to show that interfirm coordination partially mediates the relationship between contract completeness, defined as the extent to which a contract specifies task operations and contingencies, and partnership performance. Furthermore, we find that more complete contracts can attenuate the negative effects of equity ownership on coordination, and that this effect is particularly strong when partner tasks are interdependent and relational norms are weak.
Keywords: Interfirm partnerships; Coordination; Contracts; Equity ownership; Formal control; Partnership performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0263237319301495
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eurman:v:38:y:2020:i:3:p:413-424
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/115/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... me/115/bibliographic
DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2019.12.005
Access Statistics for this article
European Management Journal is currently edited by Michael Haenlein
More articles in European Management Journal from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().