Hostile takeover bids and shareholder wealth: Some UK evidence

Chris Parkinson

European Management Journal, 1991, vol. 9, issue 4, 454-459

Abstract: This paper presents a discussion of the motives for mergers and the results of a UK study into the effect of hostile bids on shareholder wealth. Significant gains are obtained by shareholders in target companies which successfully defend a bid. These gains are not lost up to two years after the failure of the bid. Shareholders in the bidding companies receive gains much smaller than those of the targets, but these are also maintained after the bid.

Date: 1991
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