How was the quantitative easing program of the 1930s Unwound?
Matthew Jaremski () and
Explorations in Economic History, 2018, vol. 69, issue C, 27-49
Outside of the recent past, excess reserves have only concerned policymakers in one other period: the Great Depression. The data show that excess reserves in the 1930s were never actively unwound through a reduction in the monetary base. Nominal economic growth swelled required reserves while an exogenous reduction in monetary gold inflows due to war embargoes in Europe allowed excess reserves to naturally decline towards zero. Excess reserves fell rapidly in early 1941 and would have unwound fully even without the entry of the United States into World War II. Consequently, policy tightening was at no point necessary and could have contributed to the 1937–1938 Recession.
Keywords: Quantitative easing; Excess reserves; Gold flows; Great depression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E58 N12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: How was the Quantitative Easing Program of the 1930s Unwound? (2017)
Working Paper: How Was the Quantitative Easing Program of the 1930s Unwound? (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:exehis:v:69:y:2018:i:c:p:27-49
Access Statistics for this article
Explorations in Economic History is currently edited by R.H. Steckel
More articles in Explorations in Economic History from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().