Economics at your fingertips  

Outside CEOs, board control and the financing policy of small privately held family firms

Andy Lardon, Marc Deloof and Ann Jorissen

Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2017, vol. 8, issue 1, 29-41

Abstract: We investigate how the presence of an outside CEO is related to the financing policy of privately held family firms, taking into account the degree of family control via the board of directors. For a sample of 367 Belgian firms we find that family firms with an outside CEO have a lower leverage, although they take more entrepreneurial risk. The negative relation between the presence of an outside CEO and leverage is more pronounced for long-term debt than for short-term debt. Family control via the board of directors reduces the effect of an outside CEO on entrepreneurial risk and leverage.

Keywords: Family Firms; Outside CEO; Board Control; Debt Policy; Entrepreneurial Risk Taking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier. ... 719791/bibliographic

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Family Business Strategy is currently edited by J.H. Astrachan

More articles in Journal of Family Business Strategy from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2017-09-29
Handle: RePEc:eee:fambus:v:8:y:2017:i:1:p:29-41