Too much of a good thing: Family involvement and the survival of listed Korean firms
Danny Miller and
Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2018, vol. 9, issue 4, 223-237
There is a quandary facing many family businesses: namely, that although initially positive for firm survival, beyond a certain level of family ownership, family involvement in ownership and/or management may threaten firm survival, especially under later generation family CEOs. We argue and find in a study of listed Korean firms that a balance between family and public ownership enhances firm survival. Under balanced ownership both types of owners can prevent one another’s excesses. Moreover, the negatives of too much family ownership are accentuated when there are family CEOs, particularly in post-founder generations.
Keywords: Family firm governance; Family involvement; Firm survival; Agency costs; Listed korean firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:fambus:v:9:y:2018:i:4:p:223-237
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