The political economy of timber taxation: The case of Ghana

Christian P. Hansen and Jens Lund ()

Forest Policy and Economics, 2011, vol. 13, issue 8, 630-641

Abstract: We analyze the political economy of timber taxation in Ghana. Our results show that politicians maintain control over allocation of timber rights, that taxation constitutes an insignificant share of the value of the timber resource, and that the distribution of timber revenues hardly contributes towards the official forest policy justifications. Our analysis suggests that politicians wield control over rent-seeking opportunities that are exchanged for political support through patron-client networks. This speaks to a larger literature on why governments waste resources and constitutes an argument for increased attention to the political economy underlying natural resource policies.

Keywords: Forest; Rent; Africa; Concession; Fiscal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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