Bid caps in large contests
Wojciech Olszewski and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 115, issue C, 101-112
We study the effect of rigid and flexible bid caps on contestants' aggregate costs and aggregate bids in all-pay contests with a large number of heterogeneous contestants and prizes.
Keywords: Contests; All-pay auctions; Large contests; Bid caps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:115:y:2019:i:c:p:101-112
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