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Bid caps in large contests

Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 115, issue C, 101-112

Abstract: We study the effect of rigid and flexible bid caps on contestants' aggregate costs and aggregate bids in all-pay contests with a large number of heterogeneous contestants and prizes.

Keywords: Contests; All-pay auctions; Large contests; Bid caps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:115:y:2019:i:c:p:101-112