Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory

Gilad Bavly and Ron Peretz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 115, issue C, 131-145

Abstract: We study repeated games in which each player i is restricted to (mixtures of) strategies that can recall up to ki stages of history. Characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs boils down to identifying the individually rational level (“punishment level”) of each player.

Keywords: Repeated games; Bounded complexity; Equilibrium payoffs; Bounded recall; Finite automata; Concealed correlation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:115:y:2019:i:c:p:131-145

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.003

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