The duality gap for two-team zero-sum games

Leonard J. Schulman and Umesh V. Vazirani

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 115, issue C, 336-345

Abstract: We consider multiplayer games in which the players fall in two teams of size k, with payoffs equal within, and of opposite sign across, the two teams. In the classical case of k=1, such zero-sum games possess a unique value, independent of order of play. However, this fails for all k>1; we can measure this failure by a duality gap, which quantifies the benefit of being the team to commit last to its strategy. We show that the gap equals 2(1−21−k) for m=2 and 2(1−m−(1−o(1))k) for m>2, with m being the size of the action space of each player. Extensions hold also for different-size teams and players with various-size action spaces.

Keywords: Teams; Duality gap; Weak selection model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:115:y:2019:i:c:p:336-345

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.011

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