On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules

Michael Trost

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 116, issue C, 1-37

Abstract: In this paper, we detect meaningful properties of choice rules ensuring that the solution generated by iterated application of choice rules specifies the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow these rules and commonly believe this. Our main result is based on four substantial assumptions on choice rules. Whenever the players' choices rules satisfy - besides the technical assumption of regularity - the properties of reflexivity, monotonicity, Aizerman's property, and the independence of payoff equivalent conditions, then such coincidence occurs. This result proves to be strict in the following sense. None of the four substantial properties can be omitted without eliminating the coincidence.

Keywords: Iterative deletion procedure; Common belief; Choice rule; Epistemic game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:116:y:2019:i:c:p:1-37

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.015

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